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Summary
The influence of environmental policy on innovative behaviour of companies has so
far recieved little attention in scientific discourse. Based on recent literature, the pa-
per analyses the impact of requirements, levies, permits, liability laws, and the EC-
eco-audit regulation with respect to the generation ofenvironmentally benign innova-
tions. Most theoretical s~dies come to the conclusion that direct requirements provi-
de little incentives for dynamic effects and that emission taxes and permits are better
instruments to promote innovations. However, the empirical studies show that the dy-
namic effects of environmental policy instruments in practice partly differ from the
ideal instruments analyzed in theoretical studies.
I Forthcomming in European Planning Studies. The article is based on a ZEW/SEQ-study commis-
sioned by the European Commission, DG XII (cf. HEMMELSKAMP et al. 1995).1 Introduction
Environmental pollution caused by human beings has always been a considerable
problem in Europe. In the Middle Ages, for example, rivers and lakes were contami-
nated because faeces of humans and animals were dumped into them. These water
reserves served as drinking water reservoirs at the same time, so that illnesses (e.g.
the plague) were able to spread easily and to take on epidemic proportions. Technical
innovations in the course of the industrial development helped to improve these con-
ditions. The invention of the steam engine, for instance, made it possible to get clean
water from deep wells and to supply the population with uncontaminated drinking
water.
At the same time, however, it became clear that technical progress can create new or
solve and reduce existing environmental problems. Parallel to increasing industrialisa-
tion, the development of modem technologies and the ever-more intensive use of the
environment, new environmental and resource problems were created, since the envi-
ronment was the supplier of non-renewable and renewable natural resources, the di-
rect recipient of pollutants from the production process and the indirect recipient of
pollutants generated by product distribution, use and disposal (cf. FABER et al. 1983;
DUCHINILANGE 1994; KEMP/SOETE 1990).
Therefore "some people regard technological developments as one of the greatest
threats to nature and the environment. Others, by contrast, see them as a possible sal-
vation" (WETERINGS/OPSCHOOR 1992:3). If the latter are right, then technological
progress must result in companies being able to generate innovations which make it
possible to:
• come up with new possibilities for the substitution ofnatural resources,
• reduce specific impacts on the environment,
• improve resource productivity or
• improve the reversib~lity ofenvironmental damage.
Issues related to innovation research have been examined in a host of studies during
the past few years. The emphasis was placed, amongst other things, on investigating
innovation objectives or measuring innovation success. Little attention has been paid
to the impact ofenvironmental policy instruments on innovation. This article explores
whether the effects of environmental policy instruments on innovation analysed in a
merely theoretical manner differs from results of empirical studies. The paper begins
in Chapter 2 with definitions. Chapter 3 analyzes the dynamic effects ofenvironmental
policy instruments. The Chapter 4 presents some empirical studies firstly concerned
with the influence of specific environmental instruments on innovations and secondlydealing with industry-specific effects of environmental policy. Chapter 5 presents so-
me conclusions.
2 Some Definitions
In political and scientific discussions the term "innovation" is interpreted in many dif-
ferent ways. Ifa narrow definition is chosen, innovations merely denote technological
novelties. Used in a broader sense, innovations refer to novelties resulting in the
first-time application of newly acquired know-how, of new methods or new products
as well as to novelties where no new technologies are used, but where, for example,
only changes in the product design are made. So the definition of "innovations" is a
very personal one and consequently it is hard to come up with an exact delimitation in
empirical studies. Following the OECD's Oslo-Manual (1992), product innovations
are taken as meaning creation ofnew, hitherto unknown or fundamentally altered pro-
ducts (basic innovations) and improvements concerning product quality (incremental
improvement innovations), Process innovations refer to a company's gradual shift to
new or substantially improved production methods, Le., methods making it possible to
produce a given quantity at a lower cost or a larger quantity at the same cost.
On the basis of the general description of the term "innovation" environmental inno-
vations can be defined as innovations which aim at reducing the negative environmen-
tal impacts caused by production methods (process innovations) and products
(product innovations). Environmental innovations serve to:
• avoid or reduce emissions caused by the production, use or consumption and
disposal ofgoods,
• reduce resource input,
• clean up environmental damage done in the past,
• identify and control pollution.
Environmental technologies in the fj,eld ofproduction-related environmental protection
can basically be subdivided into two lines of development (paradigms): end-of-pipe
technologies and integrated technologies (cf. Figure 1).
Additive or end-of-the-pipe technologies are disposal methods and recycling techno-
logies that follow the actual production and consumption process. They dispose of or
modify the gross accumulating emissions in such a way that they become less pollu-
ting or less environmentally-harmful or can be better stored, but there is no emission
reduction in terms ofquantity.
2Instead, what is triggered off is a shift of emissions to an environmental medium
which is not yet subject to regulations and is still classified as a medium able to stand
emissions, for instance soil (disposal depots) or water. With regard to innovations,
end-of-pipe-technologies only call for incremental improvements of the original pro-
duction process, not for fundamental changes in the production process.
Figure 1: Overview ofenvironmental technologies
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Source: HOHMEYER/KosCHEL 1995:6
Unlike additive solutions, integrated environmental protection starts directly at the
source ofthe emissions, Le., at the production process or at the product. It comprises
all measures that lead. to a reduction in input materials, energy input and emissions
during the process. This includes reducing or replacing environmentally-harmful in-
puts by environmentally-friendly inputs (e.g. solvent-free lacquers) or producing more
environmentally-friendly products that release less noxious residual substances. By
applying "clean" production methods that use less input materials or generate less re-
sidual substances (e.g. by optimising individual process components or by taking
technological measures such as energy-saving process control systems) integrated
technologies are able to achieve emission reductions across the board.
In addition to that HARTJE (1990) describes a cross between end-of-pipe and integra-
ted technologies which includes recycling technologies that are integrated in the pro-
duction process and make it possible for part of the emissions generated in the pro-
3duction process to be used directly as manufacturing supplies. However, in the follo-
wing this hybrid form is subsumed under integrated technologies.
3 Innovation effects ofenvironmental policy instruments
The scale and direction of a company's innovative behaviour is generally determined
by a large number ofsupply and demand factors. Theoretical and empirical studies on
the factors of influence primarily deal with their effects on innovations in general (cf.
inter alia MAAS 1990; SCHWITALLA 1993). So far the literature on economics has gi-
ven comparatively little attention specifically to the determinants ofenvironmental in-
novations (cf. BECHER et al. 1990). Various external factors can be identified as trig-
gers ofenvironmentally-friendly innovations in companies (cf. Figure 2).
Figure 2: Factors determining environmental innovations
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Social and market-related groups are intensifying their demands that companies beha-
ve in an increasingly environmentally-sound manner. On the one hand, such "ecology-
push-factors" consist of government environmental policy instruments that confront
companies with requirements (e.g. standards) that have to be met or with levies. On
the other hand, they include demands made by residents pressing for, for example, a
reduction in the emissions released into the atmosphere or in the noise level or de-
mands made by environmental groups choosing certain environmental problems as a
central theme and calling on companies to rectify the situation. Market-related groups
(customers, consumer associations, wholesalers/retailers, investors) as "ecology-pull-
factors" may find fault with excessive product packaging and demand that the packa-




Most companies are still characterized by passive environmentally-oriented behaviour
that consists of adapting to environmental legislation or regulations (cf. inter alia
CARRARO/SINISCALDO 1994; Williams et al. 1993)3. The actual effects depend mainly
on the environmental regulatory instrument that is applied. Regulatory instruments in
terms ofenvironmental policy can be subdivided into two categories:
• Non-market solutions in the form of juridical commands and bans that merely
differentiate between admissible and inadmissible use ofthe environment.
• Instruments conforming to the market that indirectly control the economic
process by means ofthe information and control function ofprices. They include,
among other things, permits, levies, subsidies, compensations, residual pollution
levies orthe privatisation ofenvironmental media.
The effects ofenvironmental policy instruments are assessed in the relevant literature
by applying various, sometimes different criteria. ENDRES (1985), for example, analy-
ses an instrument according to the criteria "efficiency" (minimal cost to achieve emis-
sion objective), "ecological accuracy" (ecological attainment of the objective) and
"dynamic stimulating effect". The criterion ofa dynamic stimulating effect means that
the following question is examined: To what extent does an environmental policy in-
strument provide an impetus for the development and introduction ofprogress in terms
ofenvironmental technology? In the process as a rule only the effect ofthe instrument
on the reduction of a specific pollutant is taken into account. The sort of technology,
i.e., the distinction between additive and integrated environmental protection is usually
not considered (cf. HOHMEYERlKoSCHEL 1995).
In the economic process environmental policy instruments may in principle "lead firms
to adoptexisting cleaner technologies which are not currently used ..." or they stimula-
te "firms' R&D through which new environment-friendly technologies can be develo-
ped" (CARRARO/SINISCALDO 1994:549). The companies have three innovation options
to choose from:
2Reference should be made to the so-called ethics or eco-funds, which guarantee the investors
compliance with certain standards.
3Although other factors of influence, environmentally-oriented consumer behaviour in particular, are
increasingly important, their influence is still comparatively modest and restricted to certain indu-
stries. Having said that, the influence exerted by eco-labels shows that consumers are increasingly
attaching importance to environmentally-friendly products and production methods. For instance, a
study by BROCKMANN et al.(1996) proved that certifying sustainably-grown tropical timber causes
sales ofproducts made ofthis raw material to go up.
5• replacing input factors (by less scarce or by renewable resources or by inputs
that are less harmful to the environment),
• enlarging the existing or planned installation by means of an end-of-pipe-
technology i.e., the production method remains unchanged,
• the partial or complete replacement of an old installation by a new technology
integrating environmental protection, which makes it possible to economize on
resource inputs and/or causes less emissions.
In the following, by way ofexample, five instruments - requirements, levies, permits,
liability law and the eco-audit-regulation- will be analysed on the basis ofthe existing
theoretically-oriented literature and an evaluation ofthese instruments regarding their
effects on technology will be made.
3.1 The effects requirements have on innovation
Environmental requirements in the form ofcommands and bans are regulations direct-
ly related to the environment with the help of which certain environmental objectives
are meant to be achieved (cf. Figure 3). They are generally complemented by rules of
conduct for authorities. For example, emission requirements state limits which may
not be exceeded and serve as a basis for the environmental protection authorities when
they grant a permit for new installations or issue retroactive directives for existing
ones. Commands seek to reduce certain environmental impacts, whereas bans stop
certain activities. Compliance with these provisions is checked by the government and
failure to comply is penalised.
With regard to innovation generation a theoretical analysis with the help ofa model of
environmental standards and requirements STEPHAN (1987) showed that these instru-
ments provide incentives to innovate and to introduce new, environmentally-friendly
technologies. However, the effect, i.e. the extent, the speed ofimplementation and the
nature of the environmental measures, depends, as Stephan points out, on the adap-
tability ofthe production system.
Usually technological progress is based on improving efficiency in the field ofend-of-
pipe-technologies. There is largely a consensus among researchers that the influence
requirements have on progress concerning environmental technology IS minor (cf. on
this and the following remarks inter alia: FABER et al. 1989; ENDRES 1987;
HANSMEYERISCHNEIDER 1990; WALTER 1989). But CORFEE-MORLOT/JONES
(1992:17) commented, that II'command and control' systems do not always have ne-
gative impacts on technological progress. For example, regulatory 'bans' have some-
times 'forced' the development and penetration of new pollution control technolo-
gies".
6However, mostly it is pointed out that requirements constitute the most expensive op-
tion with regard to environmental policy instruments, since all polluters are treated on
an equal basis, irrespective of their individual avoidance cost structure. Thus, econo-
mic efficiency can only be achieved with this instrument in the (unrealistic) event that
the marginal avoidance costs ofall affected emitters are the same.
Figure 3: Overview ofenvironmental requirements
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Compared with other instruments, requirements are considered to be rather innovati-
on-impeding, since residual emissions, Le., emissions below the fixed level, do not
result in costs for the emitter and consequently the emitter is no longer interested in
more far-reaching emission-reducing measures. Such an incentive would only exist if
through innovations in the field ofenvironmental technology which decrease operating
cost, emissions would fall short of the limit. This, however, could tum out to be a
disadvantage for companies. The reductions achieved could indicate to the authorities
that further emission reductions are technically feasible and further tightening of the
requirements possible, so that other installations, too, have to comply with the more
stringent requirements and further costs ensue (cf. WEIMANN 1991; GEORGE et al.
1992). If, as is typical of the German-speaking area, requirements hinge the permit to
exploit the environment on compliance with certain technical standards (as a rule,
process standards based on state-of-the-art technology4) to thus make new installati-
ons adapt to technological developments and to dynamise the effect of instruments,
4ENDRES (1987:61) describes "state-of-the-art technology" as " [...] an advanced method of emissi-
on avoidance whose applicability must be ensured and of which the regulation-issuing authority
must have knowledge".
7this has a fonnative influence -on technological progress. The technological standard
has to be complied with by all emitters and therefore a tightening ofstandards makes a
steady development of new and further development of the applied technologies pos-
sible. Since, however, the companies' individual costs and different adaptation inten-
sities are not taken into account and marginal costs ofavoidance rise as efficiency im-
provements increase, the inefficiency ofthe measures also increases over time.
The threat of more stringent requirements and of an updating of state-of-the-art tech-
nology may also lead to "chartered rights to pollute" for a given installation beirig ta-
ken advantage of as long as possible. For instance, the construction of a new pro-
duction installation may be subject to lower limiting values or to new technology stan-
dards that have been adjusted to the current level ofdevelopment, and thus entail ad-
ditional costs. New installations and hence innovations will not be used until the cost
advantages for the polluter gained from "technological progress" exceed the cost
disadvantages resulting from more stringent provisions on emissions. That is why
WEIMANN (1991) calls requirements an instrument which slows down structural chan-
ge towards more environmentally-sound technologies.
Furthennore, issuing an ordinance defining state-of-the-art technology and its updating
require a lengthy procedure, because infonnation on the advanced methods ,being
'- applied has to be compiled and the general applicability of new methods has to be
discussed in consultation with experts. Hence, an efficient policy of requ~rementspre-
supposes knowledge on the part ofthe authorities ofnumerous products and activities
liriked to emissions. The administration would have to know all possibilities of brin-
ging about reductions, calculate a policy ofavoidance with minimaf cost and prescribe
the appropriate requirements. Finally, changes in these data would constantly have to
be taken into consideration and provisions that have been issued would have to be
checked. Therefore, state-of-the-art technology may have lost some ofits progressive-
ness by the time its introduction is binding or, as ENDRES (1987:62) remarks, instead
of being "today's state-of-the-art technology" it may rather "correspond to the collo-
quial expression 'yesterday's state-of-the-art technology'''.
With respect to innovation, a direct intervention by means of environmental policy
which seeks to bring about a technological adjustment by determining reference sy-
stems in the fonn of "state-of-$e-art technology" promotes technological progress
through a reactive adjustment to established standards, but no dynamic technological
progress. This effect is intensified by the need of the authorities, due to the already
described lack of infonnation and the deficits concerning decision-making and
amendment, to define "state-of-the-art technology" in cooperation with the emitters.
Therefore, the effect on innovation is limited in so far as for the emitters involved in
the decision-making process state-of-the-art technology is an endogenous quantity,
i.e., it is to be expected that the cost of emission avoidance and of changes in "state-
of-the-art technology" will be taken into account by the emitters involved and that
consequently no tough demands will be made (cf. on this inter alia WEIMANN 1991;
HEISTERIMICHAELIS 1990).
8Besides, as juridical measures increase in number, there are ever-more enforcement
problems which lead to companies exceeding the stipulated emission ceilings due to
the low risk of inspection and to minor penalties. As a result, the effect on innovation
is weakened.
Owing to the weaknesses of juridical instruments, the exploitation of the market's
technological development dynamics and the use of corresponding regulatory instru-
ments is pushed. In Denmark negotiations and agreements between the authorities and
industry with the aim oflessening specific environmental problems have been introdu-
ced as a new regulatory instrument (cf. GEORGE et al. 1992). In particular the intro-
duction of environmental taxes and charges ranks high on the academic and political
agenda. In the Netherlands "covenants" are an important regulatory instrument and the
"political debate about taxation and environmental policy has intensified" (OECD
1994:31). In Norway and Sweden, for example, C02 taxes were introduced in 1991
(cf. HAUGLAND et al. 1992) and in Germany new environmental taxes are recommen-
dedas a more efficient solution (for an overview ofthe German discussion .cf. for ex-
ample, KOSCHELIWEINREICH 1995).
3.2 The effect ofenvironmental levies oninnovation
Environmental levies are defined as payments the government demands in order to
tackle environmental issues. Environmental taxes, environmental charges and contri-
butions and special environmental levies are subsumed under the generic term envi-
ronmental levies (cf. on this HOHMEYERlKosCHEL 1995).
Unlike juridical solutions environmental levies do not prescribe binding standards,
instead, by means of a fixed price for the exploitation of the environment they may
serve to provide revenue to the government to fund environment-related measures on
the one hand, or may on the other hand, aim at offering a financial incentive for volun-
tary and individual adaptations to prevent or reduce environmental impacts. Amongst
other things, the emission level, input and product output are used as bases for as-
sessment (cf. Figure 4).
Unlike juridical measu~es, levies make an allocation possible that is efficient in terms
of the overall economy. Each emitter can assess in accordance with his individual
marginal avoidance costs, to whatextent he will take environmental protection measu-
res. He will respond by adapting if the necessary investment is more cost-effective
than the payment of levies. The liability to pay the costs encourages the search for
solutions that keep costs, levies and the exploitation of the environment as low as
possible, i.e. as a rule it encourages directly environment-conserving technological
progress, which reduces both emissions and pollution (cf. CORFEE-MORLOT/JONES
1992). The bigger the cost advantage, the greater the incentive to invest in new tech-
nologies.
9In real life levies are used in environmental policy with a-viewto attaining a setpoliti-
cal objective (standard-price-approach). However, fixing the rate of levies through a
political process is hardly possible. The establishment ofan incentive-efficient rate of
levies presupposes information on the marginal avoidance costs of all polluters, infor-
mation which in real life does not exist. Consequently, the rate has to be fixed accor-
ding to·a trial-and-error method, thus creating the danger that excessively high rates
tie up capital which can no longer be employed for R&D activities. Excessively low
rates, on the other hand, may result in existing and economically desirable methods
never becoming competitive (cf. WEIMANN 1991).
Figure 4: Overview ofenvironmental levies
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3.3 The effects environmental permits have on innovation
Environmental permits are issued by a government authority and may be traded among
companies. Each permit consists ofan emission entitlement limited in terms ofquanti-
ty and period of validity, allowing the owner to emit pollutants in specified environ-
mental media. The sum of the issued emission entitlements is equivalent to the total
volume of emissions the government wants. Permits - just like other environmental
policy instruments - thus require knowledge of the desired goals in terms of environ-
mental quality and hence knowledge ofthe total emissions permissible. In particular in
the area of prevention of air polhition government authorities have built up such
knowledge during the last twenty years. For sulphur dioxide and other air pollutants
emission reduction goals can be deduced for European countries. In other areas,
however, such as waste or soil contamination, there is a lack of information. Here,
there is a risk ofissuing too many permits and therefore of limiting the ecological ef-
fectiveness and ofgenerating only minor innovation impulses.
The trading of permits leads to the formation of a price, reflecting the scarcity of the
environmental medium and, ifthe market is in equilibrium, also the marginal avoidan-
ce costs for each individual emitter and for the overall economy (Laffontffirole 1994).
Emitters whose marginal avoidance costs are lower than the market price of the per-
10mits will reduce emissions until permit price and marginal avoidance costs corre-
spond.
Permits produce - in analogy to the levies described above - a permanent innovation
incentive and thus incentives for technological improvements. Permits that are no lon-
ger needed owing to the introduction of new emission-reducing technologies can be
sold in the marketplace. Emitters with marginal avoidance costs above the market
price of permits legalise their emissions by buying permits. The avoidance behaviour
of the emitters always changes in accordance with the price for a permit. Ultimately,
the market price will find its level and will roughly correspond to the aggregate eco-
nomic marginal avoidance costs.
Marginal avoidance costs, however, are not permanently fixed, rather, they may be
changed due to technological progress. New, more efficient and cheaper avoidance
technologies may be introduced or emission quantities may decrease by further deve-
loping production installations or substituting inputs while (production) output remains
unchanged. In connection with increased avoidance activities and the further deve-
lopment oftechnologies, however, demand for permits declines and hence their price
deteriorates, so that in a unchanged ecological framework the dynamic incentive pro-
vided by this instrument is lost in the long run (LAFFONTITIROLE 1994). Technological
progress is therefore produced through permits if a certain emission standard can be
achieved with new technologies at lower overall costs (see inter alia Endres 1985 and
1991). However, dynamic emission reductions are only possible in a stable ecological
framework if the economy grows or in the case of canging ecological framework by
devaluing the permits.
The policy of permits is criticized for making it possible to create barriers to market
entry by hoarding emission entitlements. Since in such a case new and potentially in-
novative companies with modem production installations or environmentally-friendly
products cannot buy any emission entitlements or their price is too high owing to arti-
ficially scarce supply (WEIMANN 1991).
Finally the permits ~ period of validity also has an impact on the permits ~ innovation
effects. For example, permits valid for a limited period make for greater flexibilty on
the part of the authorities when it comes to responding to new political objectives or
to changed ecological parameters. The ensuing insecurity for the companies con-
cerned, however, results above all in innovations that can be implemented quickly
and/or in economical innovations, which makes it seem likely that in the field oftech-
nology primarily end-of-pipe environmental measures will be taken. Permits with an
unlimited period of validity provide a better basis for planning, with the authorities
being to achieve new ecological goals by means of taking devaluation measures that
were announced in time. Companies can then either purchase additional permits or try
to reduce their pollutant emissions by means ofinnovation efforts.
113.4 The effects liability law has on innovation
The objectives ofliability law are based on the concepts ofdamage compensation and
damage prevention. With regard to the question of its effect on innovation it is pri-
marily the aspects ofprevention that are ofimportance. Liability law attempts to have
a preventive effect via financial incentives (cf. HEMMELSKAMP! NEUSER 1993).
Liability law is linked with the prospect that economic agents are obliged to provide
financial compensation in the event of damage if their production or insufficient pre-
ventive measures are responsible for the occurrence ofdamage and for its extent. It is
hoped that in this way those that may cause damage take the effects their actions have
on third parties into account when making a decision and that these people take mea-
sures to reduce or avoid such risks, i.e. introduce innovations.
Liability law leaves it up to the economic agents to choose the measures to be taken
according to their preparedness to take risks. Thus, an economic agent willing to take
risks will be prepared to keep prevention at a lower level than a risk-averse one. Just
how the individual will adapt and therefore the scale of the preventive effect is not
known. Hence, the efficiency of this civil law instrument cannot be clearly deter~
mined. Instead only the framework can be provided in which the innovative effects of
liability law can unfold.
The current liability system is characterised by the co-existence of two liability prin-
ciples: liability based on fault and liability regardless of fault. In the case of liability
for fault the person in question will only be charged with the damage which he or she
caused. Concerning the risks inherent in the application of technologies, the blame is
usually put on someone saying that the necessary duty to take due care when dealing
with the situation in question was neglected. The incentives for innovation which lia-
bility for fault, provides tend to be of a static nature. In practice the standard of due
care concerning the case at issue is determined in the form ofjudicial decisions. Ifthe
standard was complied with, no claims are expected in the case of liability for fault.
These incentives are thus related to those ofjuridical instruments. Liability regardless
of fault takes account of the fact that using modem technologies involves specific
risks in each case. On the one hand, utilizing this technology entitles the user to ben-
efit in terms of profits and income, on the other hand he or she is obliged to assume
responsibility for the risks concerned. Ifthe realisation of these risks causes damage,
this is sufficient reason for attribution to his or her liability obligation. Therefore, an
economic agent cannot, like in the case of liability for fault, refer to the compliance
with decrees or to permits granted by the authorities, i.e., there is a latent residual risk
providing a continuous incentive to reduce known and unknown dangers (ct. inter alia
NICKLISCH 1992). Liability regardless offault can give rise to a general and dynamic
interest in innovations if one assumes that as prevention inceases damage costs de-
crease. R&D activities to avoid or limit damage can then reduce the likelihood of
costs due to damage.
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The innovative effects have to be qualified, however, since in juridical practice the .
scope of liability is often limited. For example, the German Product Liability Act
excludes liability for development risks. This encompasses damage resulting from the
realisation ofa riskwhich was not discernible when the product was sold. This exclu-
sion means that the preventive effect ofthe German Product Liability Act is restricted
to the compilation ofthe hitherto known risk factors ora given product in order to as-
sess the liability risk and to take measures to avoid these risks. However, there is no
incentive to include those risks that have not yet been borne out in experiments (cf.
TASCHNERIFRIETSCH 1990). On the contrary, the failure to investigate safeguards the
st~ndard concerned ofthe known risks and thus the corresponding liability level.
The risk ofunlimited liability for damage caused may lead to innovations, since it is to
be expected that economic agents reduce the risk ofdamage through further and new
developments or avoid the danger altogether by discontinuing the use of high-risk
methods. Limiting liability to the assets or restricting it to personal injury and damage
to property may result in third parties having to pay for that part of the damage that
exceeds the liability ceiling. In that case, economic agents will take precautionary
measures in their company in accordance with possible damages and not'with the ex-
pected damage. Ifthe damage exceeds this amount, the person that caused it only has
to bear part of the costs. It is unlikely that a complete intemalisation can be brought
about, and the innovative effects will not be achieved in full either.
In reality there is the problem that a contested claim for damages has to be proved by
the injured party before a civil court. To that end, especially the causality between the
potentially damaging action and the damage incurred has to be proved. In particular
regarding the dangers ofmodem technologies, the information needed for such a proof
is scant. Companies and authorizing bodies may possess the information, the injured
party as a rule does not. As for the topic at issue, innovative effects of liability law,
these developments concerning the proof of causality play an important role. If the
allocation of damage in accordance with the party that caused it can be improved
through facilitating evidence, the "actual" cost burden could become visible to the
companies and potential environmental users could be prompted to avoid damage and
to reduce the likelihood of incidents and accidents by means of improved measuring
and inspection methods, amongst'other things.
In the current German Environmental Liability Act the difficulties concerning proofof
evidence are meant to be reduced with the help of a presumption ofcause inherent in
the law. It stipulates that an installation caused the damage in question ifthe installati-
on is suited to cause it. The suitability of an installation to have caused the damage
incurred has to be proved in each case. So as to reduce the lack ofinformation needed
to prove the injured party's basis ofpresumption und thus facilitate the enforcement of
a claim, the injured party has the right to demand information from the party that alle-
gedly caused the damage and from authorities. However, by facilitating proof of evi-
dence in this manner, companies may be liable for damage for which the company is
not responsible. This counterproductive effect could also impact on the technological
13control ofliability law, since liability,based on presumption means liability covers any
damage and individual activities to avoid damage do not matter any longer. The facili-
tation of proof of evidence laid down in the German Environmental Liability Act in
the form of presumption of cause has to be seen against this background. It does not
apply if an installation has been operating in accordance with the regulations, i.e., if
the licensing provisions under public law have been complied with and no break-
downs have occurred, nor does it apply if in the case at issue other things could also
have caused the damage. This favours compliance with the technological standard and
innovations, which would be possible in the case ofbinding liability, are thus severely
restricted (cf. NICKLISCH 1992).
3.5 The effects ofeco-audits on innovation
Eco-audits are evaluations with which the set of instruments to protect the environ-
ment and business activities relevant to the environment can be checked, appraised
and developed further at regular intervals. From the point of view of innovative ef-
fects, eco-audits can result in the management, but also departments of the company
such as R&D, procurement, production, distribution and waste disposal or recycling
being directly integrated in environmental policy. The thus improved transparancy of
company functions may make it possible to identify hitherto unnoticed starting points
for environment-relieving measures and lead to more economically-efficient environ-
mental protection measures, in particular to production-integrated ones. For instance,
in the purchasing department a selective environmentally-oriented choice of material
already eliminates a lot of the environmental impacts involved in production and con-
sumption. Or in the production department eco-audits in connection with the imple-
mentation ofthe concept of"lean production" and the concomitant orientation towards
efficiency can ensure an economical and therefore environmentally-sound input of
production factors. R&D could already take aspects like recyclability into considerati-
on during product development.
Due to these advantages and to the positive experience many European companies
have had using eco-audits, the European Council adopted an eco-audit regulation on
June 29, 1993, which has been in force since April 1995 (cf. COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1993). A flow chart for the EC-eco-audit is shown in Figure
5. One ofthe main concerns ofthe EC-regulation is to promote a steady improvement
in environmental protection at company level. In the following individual aspects of
the EC-eco-audit-regulation will be examined against this background (cf. HEM-
MELSKAMP/NEUSER 1994).
1. Companies taking part in the EC-eco-audit procedure may use a certificate stating
their participation for public relations ifa review carried out by an expert yields a fa-
vourable result. This way the instrument of the audit-procedure could undergo a con-
siderable change in meaning and lose a lot ofits innovative capacity. In the past it was
used by companies as an in-house instrument, which can be considered to have been
the more successful the more hitherto unidentified weak points it pinpointed or the
14more risk potentials ofexisting weak points were able to be quantified fairly precisely.
Under the EC-regulation an eco-audit could be presented as a result-oriented final
programme which only seeks a result that does not harm business interests.
Figure 5: EU-eco-audit flow chart
ZEW 1994
2. The environmental management system provided in the regulation is, amongst other
things, to ensure that environmental audits ofthe companies are carried out at regular
intervals. Nature and scope ofthe audit reviewing the tasks of the environmental ma-
nagement system, however, are not clearly described in the regulation, and therefore
when it comes to implementing the environmental audit the regulation leaves room for
extremely different interpretations. Ifthe scope of the audit is interpreted in a narrow
sense taking advantage of the discrepancy between audit criteria and depth of the in-
vestigation, superficial measures are sufficient. For example, the regulation's criteria
may be formally met by compiling manuals, instructions or similar documents without
the necessary in-depth r~views of the actual situation being carried out. However, if
the scope of the audit is seen in the context ofthe regulation's objective, i.e., a steady
improvement ofenvironmental protection at company level, then it has to be interpre-
ted in a broader sense and go beyond a system audit. A possible methodological aid
for a comprehensive overview of the ecologically-relevant effects are company
eco-balance sheets. Eco-balance sheets make it possible to document and evaluate all
15the material input and energy quantities as well as the entire real estate, all the instal-
lations and equipment and changes thereof .
3. The EC-eco-audit-regulation provides that companies participating in the system
must not only comply with all the relevant environmental provisions, but also have to
achieve an appropriate, steady improvement in environmental protection in their com-
pany "as can be brought about through the economically-justifiable application of the
best technology available" (Article 3 of the regulation). The compliance with all rele-
vant environmental provisions demanded can be called an objective yardstick for the
audit, since these standards have to be met by all companies. Obviously the compa-
nies assume that the national environmental standards, effective in the business locati-
on in question, apply. In view of the different environmental standards in the ED this
results in audit standards differing substantivally and is something representatives of
the Federal Republic of Germany in particular continually criticized while the regula-
tion was being drafted. Apart from this, checking the compliance with environmental
provisions presupposes that the company concerned knows which provisions apply to
the location. However, on account of the increasing complexity not even the compe-
tent environmental authorities immediately know the relevant standards (cf. LOBBE-
WOLF 1993). The procedure provided for in the regulation shifts the problem of kno-
wing the relevant standards to the companies. However, already implemented internal
audit procedures showed that the comparison between target and actual situation,
which aims at compliance with environmental standards (compliance audit), would
have been too expensive and time-consuming and should therefore be phased in in the
future (cf. HEUVELS 1993). Defining the scope ofthe appropriate, steady improvement
in environmental protection in the company by applying the best technology available
is entirely up to the entrepreneur as it is linked to "economically justifiable". This
yardstick can be called subjective, for it is the company that has to compile a catalo-
gue ofmeasures for the location and has to fix deadlines for the implementation ofthe
individual measures (cf. Article 2 lit c of the regulation). In that case the yardstick
applied in the audit consists in determining the degree to which measures planned and
measures implemented coincide (cf. on this Appendix II.F.2.b. of the regulation). This
results in odd constellations. For instance, a company possessing innovative techno-
logies that have already been installed can merely point to relatively minor improve-
ments, whereas a company which has just started taking such measures can record
dramatic improvements without, however, ultimately attaining the standard of its
counterpart. Or a situation arises where a company that is prepared to introduce ad-
vanced technologies and organizational innovations and is willing to bear the risk in-
volved and/or has fixed short periods for implementation, which, for example, could
only be met to 75 % by the end ofthe period under review, does worse in terms ofthe
"overall mark" it is given ,than a company that merely wants to achieve the environ-
mental objectives typical ofits industry, but succeeds 100%. In such a case this regu-
5However, the question of environmental accounting is still in the discussion stage, in particular in
companies that have adopted a holistic approach.
16lation almost constitutes an invitation to do without innovations. A technological leap
from the prevailing utilization of additive technologies to an increased application of
process-integrated technologies is hardly encouraged.
4. Profit-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will be forced to take
part in the EC-eco-audit procedure in order to remain competitive or due to demands
made by their customers. So far small and medium-sized enterprises in particular
hardly possess elements like quality assurance, which environmental management sy-
stems can build on. Initial experience with the introduction ofenvironmental manage-
ment systems in the Netherlands showed that in large companies the development of
environmental management systems had made a lot of progress, whereas in small
enterprises due to lack oftime and capacity shortages the establishment ofthe system
had not made sufficient headway. "Small enterprises usually do not have separate en-
vironmental departments, which can initiate such an introduction (ofan environmental
management system) and support it" (SOMEREN van 1994:49). That is why in these
enterprises in particular the regulation could produce effective impacts on innovation
regarding a steady improvement in environmental protection.
4 Some results ofempirical studies
In the previous section an overview of the effects of different environmental policy
instruments on innovation was given. The overall conclusion theoretical studies draw
is that in general economic instruments like levies are more likely to prompt innovati-
ons than juridical measures such as requirements. Juridical measures favour innovati-
ons in end-of-pipe-technologies whereas economic instruments mostly promote inno-
vation in the field ofintegrated technologies.
In this section empirical studies on the effects of environmental instruments will be
discussed. The aim is to look what innovation effects different environmental instru-
ments have in practice. There are only a limited number of empirical studies on the
effects of environmental regulations on innovative behaviour. In the process we will
firstly draw on studies concerned with the influence of individual regulations (levies,
standards, subsidies), and secondly on studies dealing with industry-specific effects
(packaging, chemical, ~extile and foundry industry).
4.1 Emission levies: The emuentlevy in Germany
At an industry level FABER/STEPHAN (1987) conducted a case study in Germany ex-
amining the adaptation processes in a large chemical company in the field ofpreventi-
on of water pollution. The company managed to drastically reduce the amount of ef-
fluents by cutting the production ofeffluent-intensive goods and establishing a closed
cycle, amongst other things, as well as by introducing new production methods. The
shorter the period was to adapt to the new regulations, the greater the financial burden
ofthe company was.
17Considerable influence on environmental protection measures in the field of effluents
has been exerted in Germany by the Water Pollution Control Levy Act
(Abwasserabgabengesetz, AbwAG). Effluent levies have been charged in Germany
since 1981 and have been modified in four amendments. The adoption ofthe AbwAG
coincided with an amendment of the Water Resources Management Act
(Wasserhaushaltsgesetz, WHG) providing that minimum standards in accordance with
the generally accepted state-of-the-art technology must be met when discharges are
authorized (MEYER-RENSCHHAUSEN 1990).
In an ex-ante empirical study prior to the effective date ofthe Water Pollution Control
Levy Act, companies and municipalities were asked about their reactions (cf.
EWRINGMANN et al. 1980). While making the qualification that apart from instruments
ofanti-water pollution policy, other factors, too, influenced the adaptive behaviour of
the sample, the study came to the conclusion that the mere announcement ofthe laws
had triggered off responses. The effluent levy was a special case in this connection,
since it was a new instrument and consequently it was difficult to obtain information
on the available technologies. There was uncertainty concerning the cost burden small
and medium-sized enterprises in particular had to expect. Nonetheless it became evi-
dent that the companies surveyed were improving effluent treatment in the run-up pha-
se. The reduction of the harmfulness of effluents was largely achieved by means of
physico-mechanical methods. Some companies changed their product range or exter-
nalized areas~of production. The fact that on the whole the effluent levy has had a
positive effect is also stressed by FABER et al. (1989).
However, FABER et al. (1989) criticize the combination of the effluent levy and the
juridical instrument ofthe Water Resources Management Act, since they feel that ta-
king into account state-of-the-art technology waters down the actual economic effect
of the effluent levy. This effect was further intensified by the recent amendments (cf.
GAWELIEWRINGMANN 1993). In her criticism lASS (1990) even attributes merely en-
forcement-enhancing functions to the effluent levy and puts the actual effects on inno-
vation down to requirements. She finds that in particular in the area of residual pollu-
tion, no reduction in emissions was accomplished, i.e. that the effluent levy failed to
have any dynamic innovative effects (cf. also MEYER-RENSCHHAUSEN 1990).
4.2 An empirical analysis ofan environmental law: The German
Toxic Substances Control Act
The German Toxic Substances Control Act covers dissemination of new chemical
compounds outside the company premises, protection of the workforce during pro-
duction, use ofhazardous substances and instructions. The Association of the Chemi-
cal Industry (VCI) and BASFPLC cite this act as an example ofthe existing excessive
regulations, which to their mind prevent innovations in the chemical industry (cf. VCI
1993; BASF 1994).
18A study on the impact of the Toxic Substances Control Act conducted by STAUDT et
al. (1993) came to the conclusion that with regard to the innovation activities the act
has lead to R&D projects on new substances being discontinued, to them being shifted
abroad and to an increased use of traditional substances. ,Staudt's study furthermore
concluded that compliance, depending on company-specific factors, entails delays and
cost increases for the companies, amongst other things due to belated market entry.
Thus, the companies, with a view to reducing costs and time, chiefly respond by im-
proving their internal organisational structures. The direction of the attempts at inno-
vation is not solely determined by the Toxic Substances Control Act, rather it depends
on the interrelationship ofvarious parameters.
However, one has to question the general validity of these findings. GLOEDE (1994),
for example, criticizes the fact that the study is based on technical interviews and case
studies which are not sufficiently representative. The delays in market entry disco-
vered by Staudt are deemed insignificant by Gloede in view ofthe overall period nee-
ded for new developments. At the same time Gloede emphasizes that many substances
on the list oftraditional substances are more like new substances, because not much is
known about their properties and the substances in question have hardly been marke-
ted to date.
4.3 Subsidies: Lessons learnt from the Danish "Clean Technology
Development Programme"
GEORGE et al. (1992) analysed how environmental innovations take place when pollu-
ters, their suppliers or consultants are engaged in the development processes initiated
through the Danish Clean Technology DeYelopment Programme. Therefore the five




The Danish Clean Technology Development Programme (launched in 1986 with a
three-year term) supported surveys on clean technologies and their potential use in
different industries, the construction of a prototype of a computer-based information
system covering clean technologies, as well as development and implementation pro-
jects.
GEORGE et al. concluded that most ofthe clean technology solutions resulting from the
payment of subsidies were process-oriented. The programme is considered a success,
for in most projects substantial improvements in terms of environmental protection
were made without placing any financial burden on the companies. Some companies
even managed to cut costs by substituting inputs. Some ofthe results were patented or
6They defined clean technologies as technologies which "seek to prevent pollution by in-
put-substitution, process changes, encouraging recycling, lengthening product durability and deve-
loping cleaner consumer products" (GEORGE et al.I992:548).
19introduced in the market. The success is largely put down to- the fact that-firstly only
projects aiming at solving specific environmental problems were supported and se-
condly the eligibility criteria took into consideration that often it is not just the polluter
who is the innovator, but that solutions are found through cooperation between pollu-
ters, their customers, their suppliers and consultants.
4.4 Environmental innovation in the packaging industry
Retailers often point to an environmentally-oriented range ofgoods in connection with
their eco-marketing. Here the packaging ofthe products plays a decisive part.
Against this background COTTICA (1994) looked at innovations in the packaging in-
dustry that reduced environmental impacts. The term "packaging industry" encompas-
ses companies producing the packaging (or intermediate products) or the correspon-
ding processing technology.
On the basis of company surveys he describes specific activities in the framework of
individual strategies (elimination ofpackaging, weight reduction, reusability, recycling
and material substitution) which reduce negative effects on the environment caused by
packaging. From the talks the following hypotheses are deduced:
• Environmental innovations constitute a steady growth process which starts off
from the existing technology
• Environmental innovations are characterized by vertical cooperation in the
packaging industry.
These hypotheses were tested in an econometric analysis based on data on successful
innovations in the packaging industry?
The statement on cooperation behaviour is borne out. It also becomes evident that the
environmental innovations in question go hand in hand with cost cutting. The extent to
which environmental innovations are technology- or market-induced, are stimulated by
a legal framework orhave to be seen as a comprehensive change oftechnology cannot
be determined clearly owing to ins~gnificant or missing data. Some statements on the-
se questions are made on the basis ofplausibility considerations.
To conclude with, Cottica suggest that there are a great many environmental innovati-
ons in connection with the existing technology. They are usually associated with in-
dustry-specific advantages (e.g. cost savings through reduction in packaging). Howe-
ver, there was no comprehensive technological re-orientation as a result of the inno-
7Successful innovations are defined as innovations that won awards in mostly national competitions
in the packaging industry.
20vation activities. Far-reaching innovations are prevented by uncertainties about the
kind of packaging and disposal solutions that are to be viewed as environmental-
ly-friendly and socially desirable.
4.5 Effects ofenvironmental regulations in the titanium-dioxide in-
dustry
Titanium dioxide is a pigment which is chiefly used in the paint and lacquer industry,
in the plastics processing industry and in the paper industry. KOSCHEL (1994) in an
empirical study examined the impact of environmental regulations on technological
change in the production oftitanium dioxide
8
•
When producing titanium dioxide by sulphate pulping, which is prevalent in Europe,
amongst other things dilute acid is obtained. Up until the late 80ies this dilute acid was
dumped on the high seas. In the early 70ies this practice of disposal was already
coming in for increasing criticism. The discussion prompted juridical environmental
policy measures, which in the case of the titanium industry lead to environmental in-
novations at the process level. Regarding old installations, these consist in end-of-
pipe- and recycling solutions complementing sulphate pulping. These retrofitted
sulphate installations presently dominate titanium dioxide production in Europe. The
study showed that environmental innovations greatly hinged on the introduction of
legal regulations. Koschel also points out the possibility of pioneer profits through
early innovations. As a result ofcomplying with environmental regulations, a German
company was considerably burdened in t!Je 80i~s with expenditure on R&D for titani-
um dioxide production, causing the company to be at a disadvantage compared with
its foreign competitors. Following the introduction of a European-wide directive on
avoidance ofpollution caused by the titanium industry in 1989, the company benefited
from its technological lead.
In the US environmental regulations also induced innovations in the titanium dioxide
industry. These, however, lead to an almost complete phase-out of sulphate pulping
and to the introduction of the chloride method, which had been developed more
recently. Koschel does not attribute the differences in terms ofthe technology chosen
between European and American companies to the environmental instruments applied,
rather, in Europe the goo'd supply with raw materials for sulphate pulping was a major
reason. Another reason is to be found in the fact that the best technology, developed
by an American company, was unavailable in Europe, as no licenses were granted for
it. The production of titanium dioxide specialities for export, which was important in
Europe, required the broader product specification ofsulphate pulping.
8The findings of the study are based on an in-depth analysis of the literature and on numerous talks
with experts from the titanium dioxide industry.
214.6 Theeffects environmental regulations have on innovation in the
foundry and textile industry
In a written survey ofcompanies belonging to the German gray cast iron foundry in-
dustry the link between environmental protection and innovation was examined (cf.
THEIBEN 1987). The foundry industry is among the contracting industries in Germany
and produces in a relatively environmentally-intensive manner. To start with the study
analysed the company features which are believed to influence innovative behaviour.
They are: size of the company, location, number of R&D staff, share of university
graduates, R&D expenditure, production technology, water requirements and effluents
as well as environmental regulations. Among the relevant environmental regulations
are environmental requirements concerning effluent temperature, noise emission and
air pollution control in accordance with the Technical Instructions for Air (TA-Luft).
Large companies were not found to be harder hit by regulations. However, smaller
enterprises tend to spend a larger proportion of their turnover on environmental pro-
tection. 11}e companies examined primarily chose end-of-pipe-solutions as environ-
mental protection measures, dust extraction plants for example. On the whole the pro-
duction process in the gray cast iron foundry companies has become more productive,
more energy efficient and more environmentally-friendly over the past years.
The study is restricted to descriptive analyses ofthe above mentioned factors influen-
cing innovative behaviour. Links between the factors are not established. The extent
to which innovations are a consequence of the environmental regulation intensity in
this industry is not a central theme.
MAAS (1987) conducted a written survey along the same lines in the German textile
industry. This industry is equally faced with requirements to reduce effluents, outgoing
air or noise. The most important innovations in the textile industry aimed at automa-
ting production. The measures primarily served to rationalize, however, almost auto-
matically, they resulted in an improvement of the environment due to a more efficient
use of resources. Environmental innovations were primarily implemented because of
environmental regulations concerning effluents, but also concerning noise and air. The
measures adopted included both integrated and end-of-pipe-measures. For example, a
reduction in air pollution was achieved by limiting the use offuel oil in favour of gas
or by means of automatic apportioning of dyes which reduces water pollution caused
by dyes.
5 Conclusions
The technological know-how a company has gained over time determines the future
choice and application of processes and products. A fundamental change in the di-
rection ofinnovation efforts entails at least a partial loss ofacquired knowledge on the
part of the company. That is why innovations as a rule build on experiences gained in
the past, resulting in continuous and successive improvements of an existing product
or a production process. Radical innovations" on the other hand, which make it pos-
22sible to gain a lead in terms of know-how in new areas of technology, are rarely at-
tempted. By shaping the parameters external to companies, the government can exert
a significant influence on the direction of innovation. One important influence on in-
novation processes are environmental policy measures. However, the impact of envi-
ronmental measures on a company's innovative behaviour has hitherto received little
attention in the research community and In the political debate.
Most theoretical studies comparing innovative effects of individual environmental re-
gulations come to the conclusion that direct requirements provide little incentives for
dynamic effects and that emission taxes and permits are better instruments to promote
innovations. However, the empirical studies show that the dynamic effects of envi-
ronmental policy instruments in practice partly differ from the ideal instruments analy-
zed in theoretical studies.
One reason could be that the real design ofenvironmental instruments is influenced by
the environmental policy process. The way environmental regulations are worded and
introduced is usually determined by the interaction between the legislator, federations
ofbusiness enterprises, trade unions and the public and their corresponding interests.
This potential discrepancy between theoretical assumptions and- practical implementa-
tion regarding the design of environmental regulations became evident in the case of
the German effluent levy.
Another reason is that environmental policy instruments merely constitutes one of
many innovation-relevant determinants. Modem theoretical as well as empirical inno-
vation research makes distinctions between numerous economic, social, legal or tech-
nological factors influencing the scope and the direction ofR&D activities as well as
the generation ofinnovations, their market launch and diffusion. Such factors are:
• company size and market structure,
• demand pull,
• technological opportunities,
• appropriability conditions (like patents),
• certain company characteristics and
• legal and administrative framework under which environmental policy can also
be subsumed.
The impact ofan environmental policy instrument on innovations strongly depends on
the influence ofthese factors. Consequently, studies on the innovative effects ofenvi-
ronmental policy instruments should take these innovation-relevant factors into ac-
count and examine them closely.
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